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Abstract
Since the time of Plato, philosophers and educational policy-makers have assumed that the study of mathematics improves
one’s general ‘thinking skills’. Today, this argument, known as the ‘Theory of Formal Discipline’ is used in policy debates to
prioritize mathematics in school curricula. But there is no strong research evidence which justifies it. We tested the Theory of
Formal Discipline by tracking the development of conditional reasoning behavior in students studying post-compulsory
mathematics compared to post-compulsory English literature. In line with the Theory of Formal Discipline, the mathematics
students did develop their conditional reasoning to a greater extent than the literature students, despite them having
received no explicit tuition in conditional logic. However, this development appeared to be towards the so-called defective
conditional understanding, rather than the logically normative material conditional understanding. We conclude by arguing
that Plato may have been correct to claim that studying advanced mathematics is associated with the development of
logical reasoning skills, but that the nature of this development may be more complex than previously thought.
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Introduction
‘‘Those who have a natural talent for calculation are
generally quick at every other kind of knowledge; and even
the dull, if they have had an arithmetical training […]
become much quicker than they would otherwise have
been.’’ (Plato [1] p. 256)
For millennia it has been assumed that people can be taught to
think more logically, and in particular, that mathematics is a useful
tool for doing so. This idea is known as the Theory of Formal
Discipline (TFD) and dates from the time of Plato. It is exemplified
by the philosopher John Locke’s suggestion that mathematics
ought to be taught to ‘‘all those who have time and opportunity,
not so much to make them mathematicians as to make them
reasonable creatures’’ [2] Similarly, the contemporary mathema-
tician Amitsur argued that ‘‘through mathematics we also wish to
teach logical thinking – no better tool for that has been found so
far’’ [3].
In view of its intellectual pedigree and clear policy implications,
variants of the TFD are regularly cited in educational policy
debates and curricula reform documents [4,5]. The National
Council for Teachers of Mathematics’ (NCTM) Principles and
Standards, for example, stated that studying mathematics is
important because ‘‘students who can use many types of reasoning
and forms of argument will have resources for more effective
reasoning in everyday situations’’ ([6], p.345). Similarly, in a
report to the UK government, Smith [7] argued that mathematics
education ‘‘disciplines the mind, develops logical and critical
reasoning, and develops analytical and problem-solving skills to a
high degree’’ (p.11).
Society’s views on the TFD have important practical implica-
tions. Stanic [8] noted that changes to the US school-level
mathematics curriculum have been substantially related to views
about the veracity of the TFD. The theory also appears to be
implicitly endorsed by the employment market: in the UK,
workers who have studied post-compulsory mathematics earn, at
the age of 33, 7–10% more than those with similar ability and
qualifications [9]. Clearly the study of advanced mathematics is
valued by employers and policy-makers. Although this is largely
because mathematical knowledge is important in its own right, it
also appears to be influenced by the belief that studying
mathematics makes one more ‘logical’. The question that naturally
arises concerns whether the TFD is accurate: does studying
advanced mathematics develop one’s logical reasoning skills?
Training reasoning skills
Psychological evidence relating to the TFD is inconclusive.
Thorndike [10] measured the effect of one year of schooling in
various combinations of subjects on performance on an intelli-
gence test. His findings revealed small improvements associated
with the study of French, chemistry and trigonometry, while
arithmetic, geometry and algebra were associated with improve-
ments barely above zero. These and other findings (e.g., [11,12])
have led many researchers to conclude that reasoning skills cannot
be divorced from the context in which they are learnt, and
therefore to reject the TFD.
Cheng, Holyoak, Nisbett and Oliver [13] found that even
training in formal logic did not improve performance on a
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conditional logic task. Their participants were given 40 hours of
training in the logic of the conditional, including modus ponens,
modus tollens, denial of the antecedent, affirmation of the
consequent and the distinction between the conditional and
biconditional. Despite such comprehensive training, they found no
significant improvement in performance on four Wason selection
tasks [14]. However, this result is not easy to interpret given the
varying contexts in which Cheng et al. situated their problems.
More recently researchers have questioned whether selection tasks,
and in particular contextualized selection tasks, measure condi-
tional reasoning at all (e.g., [15,16]).
Despite these negative findings, there has been some support for
the idea that studying mathematics might develop conditional
reasoning ability. Lehman and Nisbett [17] tracked the develop-
ment of statistical reasoning, verbal reasoning and conditional
reasoning in US undergraduates over their four years of study.
Although they did not study mathematics students, they did find a
significant correlation between improvement in conditional
reasoning and the number of mathematics courses taken by the
natural science students in their sample. However, their condi-
tional reasoning test consisted of only one abstract, one causal-
framed and one permission-framed Selection Task, and one
biconditional Selection Task, and so suffered from the same
limitations as that used by Cheng et al. [13].
Inglis and Simpson [18] found that mathematics undergradu-
ates ‘outperformed’ intelligence-matched comparison undergrad-
uates on a 32-item abstract conditional inference task [19]: in
other words that their behavior more closely matched a material
interpretation of conditionals (discussed below). However, across
the course of their first year of studies there were no changes in
reasoning behavior. Inglis and Simpson offered two possible
explanations for the initial between-groups difference on entry to
university: either those who are more likely to adopt the material
conditional are disproportionately filtered into studying university-
level mathematics, or that studying post-compulsory but pre-
university mathematics influences conditional reasoning behav-
iour. This latter account is plausible because in England (where,
like ours, Inglis & Simpson’s study was conducted) students are
able to drop mathematical study at age 16. A minority choose to
study it at ‘Advanced Level’ (commonly referred to as A-Level), a
two year course, the results of which are used by universities to
select incoming undergraduates. Students typically take three or
four subjects at A-Level, of which mathematics might be one, or
(rarely) two. It might be that studying A-Level mathematics
develops one’s ability to reason logically, although the A-Level
syllabus contains no tuition on conditional statements. A third
possibility is that the difference found by Inglis and Simpson was
due to between-group differences unrelated to intelligence (which
they controlled for), such as thinking dispositions. In this paper we
aim to distinguish between these three hypotheses.
Models of the Conditional
Abstract conditional reasoning consists of drawing conclusions
from a conditional statement ‘if p then q’ and a premise. Here we
restrict our interest to what Evans, Handley, Neilens & Over [20]
referred to as basic conditionals: those concerning abstract
relationships which are, at least in principle, empirically verifiable
(e.g. ‘‘if there is a T on the card, then there is a 7 on the card’’).
Four inferences are typically drawn by participants: modus ponens
(MP), denial of the antecedent (DA), affirmation of the consequent
(AC) and modus tollens (MT). These inferences are summarised in
Table 1 (so an example of a DA inference would be to conclude
not-7 from the premises ‘if T then 7’ and not-T). The MP, DA,
AC and MT inferences are respectively drawn by around 100%,
55%, 75% and 60% of reasoners [20].
The validity of these four inferences depends upon how the
reasoner interprets ‘if p then q’. Here we briefly summarise four
possible interpretations of basic conditionals: the material condi-
tional, the biconditional, the defective conditional, and the
conjunctive conditional. Truth tables for these interpretations
are shown in Table 2.
The material conditional ‘if p then q’ is true except when p and
not-q are true; under this interpretation the MP and MT
inferences are valid, and the DA and AC inferences invalid.
Although the material interpretation is that favored by logicians, it
is clear that this is not the meaning which arises in day-to-day
conversation, as it has the paradoxical consequence that the truth
of not-p implies anything (‘‘if Maastrict is in Belgium, then Rome is
in Italy’’ is a true statement under the material conditional). While
proponents of the TFD typically fail to explicitly state which model
of the conditional they believe mathematical study promotes, we
interpret claims about the development of ‘‘man’s purely logical
faculties’’ ([21], p. 19) as most likely being concerned with the
(logically normative) material conditional.
Table 1. The four inferences (modus ponens, denial of the antecedent, affirmation of the consequent and modus tollens) with and
without negated premises (Prem) and conclusions (Con).
MP DA AC MT
Prem Con Prem Con Prem Con Prem Con
if p then q p q not-p not-q q p not-q not-p
if p then not-q p not-q not-p q not-q p q not-p
if not-p then q not-p q p not-q q not-p not-q p
if not-p then not-q not-p not-q p q not-q not-p q p
Validity
Material Conditional Valid Invalid Invalid Valid
Defective Conditional Valid Invalid Invalid Invalid
Biconditional Valid Valid Valid Valid
Conjunction Valid Invalid Valid Invalid
The validity of each inference is shown for the material, defective, biconditional and conjunction interpretations of the conditional.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069399.t001
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Under the biconditional interpretation all four inferences are
valid: ‘if p then q’ is interpreted to mean ‘p if and only if q’.
Although this could be a conjunction of two material conditionals,
Evans et al. [20] suggested that at least some reasoners who adopt
the biconditional are actually using a ‘simple equivalence’ strategy.
Rather than conjoining two materials, they merely expect that p
and q must go together (hence MP and AC), and that not-p and
not-q must go together (hence DA and MT).
Some reasoners believe that ‘if p then q’ is only relevant when p
is true [22]. Under this so-called ‘defective’ interpretation only MP
is (immediately) valid. DA, AC and MT are not since none
involves a p premise, so the conditional adds no additional
information. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw the MT inference
under a defective interpretation using a complex combination of
MP and a contradiction argument (assume for contradiction p,
conclude q by MP, but this is a contradiction with the minor
premise not-q, so the assumption p cannot be correct, hence not-p).
Mental logic theorists suggest that the relative complexity of this
string of deductions is why MT is not as frequently made as MP
(e.g., [23]). Finally, reasoners may interpret ‘if p then q’ to mean
simply ‘p and q’ [24]. Under this conjunctive interpretation both
MP and AC are valid, but neither DA nor MT are (since neither
has a p or q premise).
Theories of reasoning differ on the causes of the different
interpretations. For example, the mental models theory [25]
suggests that reasoners typically represent a conditional ‘if p then q’
with one explicit mental model, together with an implicit model
that denotes the possible existence of not-p cases:
p q
Some high-ability reasoners may flesh out the implicit model (a
cognitively demanding task), giving them access to the material
conditional and the MT inference. But reasoners who forget about
the implicit model, or who lack the working memory capacity to
flesh it out, are left with their initial explicit model, leading to
either the defective or conjunctive interpretation.
In contrast, Evans et al.’s [20] suppositional account suggests
that there are two groups of reasoners: (i) a less sophisticated group
who see the probability of a conditional P(if p then q) as being
equal to the probability of the conjunction P(p & q), this results in
the ‘simple equivalence’ strategy discussed earlier; and (ii) a more
sophisticated group who see it as being equal to the conditional
probability P(q|p), which results in the defective interpretation.
Evans et al. suggested that their account can be distinguished from
the mental models theory by considering the MT inference. Under
Johnson-Laird & Byrne’s [25] account, the MT inference should
be made by relatively high-ability reasoners (since it involves the
fleshing out of implicit models). In contrast the suppositional
account suggests that higher-ability participants should draw the
MT inference less, as it does not immediately follow from the
defective interpretation. In support of this latter account, several
studies have found that measures of intelligence are negatively
correlated with the frequency of the MT inference [20,26].
Our goal here was to determine whether, as predicted by TFD,
studying mathematics impacts upon students’ conditional reason-
ing. In particular, we investigated whether the extent to which
students adopted the material, biconditional, defective and
conjunctive interpretations of the conditional changed following
a year of mathematical study.
While the TFD claims that studying mathematics develops one’s
reasoning skills, it does not suggest any cognitive mechanisms for
the change. Reasoning performance is related to measures of
cognitive capacity (i.e., general intelligence; [20,26,27]) and
thinking dispositions (i.e., the tendency to use one’s cognitive
capacity to solve problems; [28]). It is therefore possible that if
studying mathematics did change conditional reasoning behavior
it might do so via changes in either cognitive capacity or thinking
disposition. Here we investigated whether either of these
possibilities could provide plausible mechanisms by which the
TFD might operate.
Of course, it is neither practical nor ethical to randomly assign
participants to courses when high-stakes qualifications are at stake.
However, our inclusion of a comparison group who were studying
English literature allowed us to attenuate the non-random
assignment to conditions to some extent. The comparison group
allowed us to distinguish changes that occur simply due to age or
education from those specifically related to some aspect of (or
related to a factor correlated with) studying mathematics.
Summary
In sum, we asked two main questions. First, does studying post-
compulsory mathematics influence how one reasons with condi-
tionals? Second, if there is development of conditional reasoning
skills, is this the result of a domain-general change in cognitive
capacity or thinking disposition?
Method
Participants
One hundred and twenty four participants (aged 15 years 4
months–17 years 8 months, M=16 years 6 months, at Time 1)
were recruited from five schools in Leicestershire, Hampshire and
Derbyshire, UK. Seventy-seven (41 male) were studying mathe-
matics amongst any other subjects and 47 (17 male) were studying
English literature and not mathematics. The literature students
served as a comparison group. To avoid factors such as stereotype
threat [29] influencing responses, participants were not told about
the specific hypothesis, or about the mathematics versus literature
comparison. All participants provided written informed consent,
and the study was approved by Loughborough University’s Ethical
Advisory Committee.
Design
The study followed a longitudinal quasi-experimental design.
Participants were recruited after they had chosen their post-
compulsory subjects and were tested at the beginning (during the
first term and as close to the start of term as possible) and end (after
teaching had finished) of their first year of post-compulsory study.
They completed the same set of tasks at both time points.
Table 2. Truth tables for the material, defective, biconditional
and conjunction interpretations of the conditional (T – true; F
– false; I – irrelevant).
p q if p then q
Material Defective Biconditional Conjunction
T T T T T T
T F F F F F
F T T I F F
F F T I T F
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069399.t002
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The Mathematics Syllabus
Participants in the mathematics group were all studying the first
year of Advanced-Level mathematics. Although there are three
different versions of this course available to students in England, all
have similar content. Among other topics, the syllabus contained
sections on algebra, geometry, calculus, trigonometry, probability,
mathematical modeling, kinematics and forces (e.g., [30]). Most
importantly, students were not taught any proof-based mathemat-
ics, nor were they taught the definition of the conditional
statement. To formally establish this, as well as inspecting the
syllabus, we conducted an analysis of every first year A-level
mathematics examination between 2009 and 2011. Of 929
questions set, only one contained an explicit ‘‘if…then’’ sentence,
and there were no mentions at all of the terms ‘‘modus ponens’’,
‘‘modus tollens’’ or ‘‘conditional’’.
Measures
Conditional Inference. Participants completed Evans et al.’s
[19] version of the Conditional Inference Task. The task consists
of 32 abstract items of four inference types: MP, DA, AC and MT.
The inferences used are shown in Table 1; half of the problems
used explicitly negated premises (e.g. not-4 was represented as
‘‘not 4’’) and half used implicitly negated premises (e.g. not-4 was
represented as, for example, ‘‘8’’). The lexical content of the rules
were generated randomly and the order of the problems was
randomized for each participant. The instrument was preceded by
the instructions used by Evans et al. An indicative item of each
inference type is shown in Figure 1.
Cognitive Capacity: Raven’s Advanced Progressive
Matrices (RAPM). An 18 item subset of RAPM with a 15
minute time limit was used as a measure of cognitive capacity
[31,32].
Thinking Dispositions: Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT). As suggested by Toplak et al. [28], we used the number
of intuitive responses given to the three-item CRT [33] as a
(reverse-scored) performance measure of participants’ rational
thinking dispositions. Toplak et al found the CRT to be a better
predictor of rational responding to reasoning tasks than cognitive
ability, executive functions, or the 41-item Actively Openminded
Thinking scale. These questions, shown in Figure 2, were
randomly intermixed with three simple mathematical word
problems of a similar length from the Woodcock-Johnson III
Applied Problems subtest. This was intended to prevent the ‘trick’
nature of the CRT questions from being recalled at the second
time point. We also included the self-report Need for Cognition
Scale [34] as an additional measure of thinking disposition, but
found no between-groups differences, nor any development during
the course of the year (ps..4), and therefore omit further
discussion of these data.
Prior Academic Attainment. We asked participants to
report their General Certification of Secondary Education (GCSE,
the examinations taken by 16 year-old school leavers in England)
grades. Each grade was converted to an 8-point scale (A*= 8,
A=7, etc) and summed to produce a total score.
Mathematics Manipulation Check. A 15-item mathemat-
ics test was included as a manipulation check. Twelve items were
taken from the Woodcock-Johnson III Calculation subtest. Nine
had shown an average accuracy of less than 55% and correlated
with performance on the whole test at.86 in a previous dataset
with mixed-discipline undergraduate students [35]. Three items
were taken from the lower range to prevent floor effects in the
literature group. The final three items on the test were the most
difficult items on the Loughborough University diagnostic test for
incoming mathematics undergraduates, based on performance in
2008 and 2009. Questions were presented in a set order that was
intended to be progressive.
Procedure
Participants took part in groups (5–34) during the school day
under examination conditions. All tasks were given in a single
paper booklet. The RAPM task was always completed first with a
15 minute time limit, and the order of the subsequent tasks was
counterbalanced between-participants following a Latin Square
design. Participants were instructed to work at their own pace until
they had completed all tasks and the sessions lasted approximately
45 minutes.
Results
Preliminary analyses
Data inclusion. Forty-four mathematics students and thirty-
eight literature students took part at both time points and were
included in the analysis. Those who dropped out of the study had
typically moved schools or changed courses; there were no
significant differences in Time 1 scores on any of the measures
between those who took part at Time 2 and those who dropped
out (ps..15).
Covariates. Descriptive statistics for the various covariates
are shown in Table 3. At Time 1, the mathematics group scored
significantly higher on the RAPM, t(79) = 3.38, p= .001, and
CRT, t(79) = 4.79, p,.001, and had marginally higher prior
academic attainment, t(122) = 3.89, p= .089, than the literature
group. Furthermore, the RAPM, r= .417, p,.001, CRT, r= .417,
p,.001, and prior academic attainment, r= .304, p,.001, scores
were significantly correlated with the extent to which conditional
inferences were evaluated in line with the material conditional
conception (defined below as the material conditional index).
Consequently RAPM, CRT and prior attainment are used as
covariates in subsequent analyses. Although both groups improved
their RAPM and CRT scores slightly over the course of the year,
Figure 1. Four indicative items from the Conditional Inference
Task (adapted from [19]). The problems ask about a) the modus
ponens inference, b) the denial of the antecedent inference, c) the
affirmation of the consequent inference, and d) the modus tollens
inference.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069399.g001
Figure 2. The three items from the Cognitive Reflection Test
[33].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069399.g002
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neither Group6Time interaction effect approached significance,
ps..2.
Manipulation Check. The mathematics group showed
significantly greater improvement on the mathematics test than
the literature students, F(1,79) = 46.324, p,.001, confirming that
as a group they engaged with and learned from their year of
studying mathematics.
Conditional Inference Scores
Endorsement rates of each inference type were analysed with a
26462 ANOVA with two within-subjects factors: Time (start and
end of the year) and Inference Type (MP, DA, AC, MT), and one
between-subjects factor: Group (mathematics and literature). This
revealed a significant three-way interaction, F(3,228) = 7.476,
p,.001, gr
2= .090, shown in Figure 3, which remained significant
after controlling for Time 1 RAPM, Time 1 CRT and prior
academic attainment, F(3,216) = 5.103, p= .002, gr
2= .066. Com-
pared to Time 1, the mathematics students at Time 2 endorsed
more MP inferences, t(42) = 2.420, p= .020, d= .413, and rejected
more DA, t(42) = 3.978, p,.001, d=2.607, AC, t(42) = 3.060,
p= .004, d=2.468, and MT inferences, t(42) = 2.877, p= .006,
d=2.446. In contrast, the literature group showed no significant
differences between Time 1 and Time 2 scores for any inference,
although there was a marginally significant increase in the number
of DA inferences endorsed, t(34) = 1.795, p= .082, d= .309.
These responses appear most consistent with an increased
tendency for the mathematics students to adopt a defective
conditional interpretation (more MP inferences and fewer DA, AC
and MT inferences were made at Time 2 compared to Time 1).
To test for this we calculated four indices for each participant (at
each time point) giving the proportion of responses consistent with
each of the four interpretations of the conditional. For example, a
person responding entirely in line with the material conditional
would respond ‘yes’ to all MP and MT inferences and ‘no’ to all
DA and AC inferences. A Material Conditional Index was
therefore computed as: number of MP inferences endorsed +
number of MT inferences endorsed + (8 – number of DA
inferences endorsed) + (8 – number of AC inferences endorsed),
giving a material conditional index score out of 32 for each
participant at each time point. The consistency scores for each
interpretation are shown in Figure 4, and were subjected to a series
of 262 ANOVAs with one within-subjects factor: Time (start and
end of the year) and one between-subjects factor: Group
(mathematics, literature). We consider each interpretation in turn.
On the material conditional analysis Group and Time
interacted, F(1,76) = 11.860, p= .001, gr
2= .135 (p= .007 with
covariates). The mathematics group became more material,
t(42) = 3.171, p= .003, d= .493, whereas the literature group did
not change, p= .092. On the biconditional analysis, Group and
Time also interacted, F(1,76) = 7.966, p= .006, gr
2= .095, al-
though this was only marginally significant when covariates were
included, F(1,72) = 3.697, p= .058, gr
2= .049. The mathematics
group became less biconditional, t(42) = 3.323, p= .002, d=2.508,
whereas the literature group did not change, p= .500.
On the defective analysis, Group and Time interacted,
F(1,76) = 17.651, p,.001, gr
2= .188 (p= .002 with covariates).
The mathematics group became more defective, t(42) = 5.756,
p,.001, d= .880, whereas the literature group did not change,
p= .767. Finally, on the conjunctive analysis, Group and Time
also interacted, F(1,76) = 8.525, p= .005, gr
2= .101 (p= .014 with
covariates). The mathematics group became more conjunctive,
Table 3. Means and standard deviations for measures of covariates and mathematical achievement.
Mathematics Literature
Theoretical maximumMean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Time 1 RAPM 18 9.64 3.32 6.94 3.54
Time 1 CRT intuitive (reverse scored) 3 1.79 1.14 .89 .85
Time 1 Mathematics 15 4.86 1.59 3.50 .97
Prior academic attainment – 66.45 9.78 61.53 14.03
Time 2 RAPM 18 10.64 2.93 7.32 3.15
Time 2 CRT intuitive (reverse scored) 3 1.98 1.02 1.11 1.02
Time 2 Mathematics 15 6.95 1.94 3.19 .57
Units are number of correct responses except for prior academic attainment, which is sum of grades for all GCSEs where A* = 8, A = 7, B = 6 etc.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069399.t003
Figure 3. The number of inferences endorsed by each group,
for MP, MT, DA and AC inferences at the two time points. Error
bars show 61 SE of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069399.g003
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t(42) = 3.534, p= .001, d= .548, whereas the literature group did
not change, p= .693.
Comparing the effect sizes of these analyses confirms that the
change in the mathematics group is best understood as an
increased tendency to adopt the defective interpretation of the
conditional. In other words, that over time the mathematics group
became more likely to endorse the MP inference, but less likely to
endorse the DA, AC and MT inferences. Next we considered
whether changes in either cognitive capacity or thinking disposi-
tion could represent domain-general mechanisms for this change
in conditional reasoning behavior.
Mechanisms of Development
To investigate whether changes in the domain-general reason-
ing measures could account for the changes in the mathematics
group’s conditional reasoning behaviour, we regressed partici-
pants’ defective conditional change scores (Time 2 defective
conditional index minus Time 1 defective conditional index)
against their Time 1 RAPM and CRT scores, their prior academic
attainment, their RAPM and CRT change scores (the difference
between their Time 2 and Time 1 scores), the group they were in,
and the two group by change-score interaction terms. If the
increased defective conditional indices of the mathematics students
could be accounted for by changes in domain general factors, we
would expect that some of the change scores or the group by
change-score interactions would be significant predictors. How-
ever, if the primary factor was the experience of studying
mathematics, we would expect the group factor to be the only
significant predictor.
The regression model is presented in Table 4. The only
significant predictor of change in defective conditional scores was
Group, b= .337. None of the change scores, nor the change by
group interactions approached significance. This analysis seems to
suggest that the change in conditional reasoning behavior in the
mathematics group is most likely to be related to experiences
gained in their mathematical study, not to domain-general
changes in cognitive capacity or thinking disposition.
Discussion
Since Plato asserted that studying mathematics improves one’s
‘quickness’ of thought, philosophers, educational policy-makers
and the employment market have placed a high value upon having
an advanced education in mathematics. Here we asked whether
Plato’s position is reasonable; in particular, we asked whether
studying post-compulsory mathematics is associated with a
development in conditional reasoning behavior, even if that study
contained no explicit reference to conditional logic. We found that
students studying post-compulsory mathematics did change their
reasoning behavior to a greater extent than a comparison group
over the course of a year of post-compulsory mathematical study.
Further, we found that this change appeared to be best described
as development away from a biconditional understanding of the
conditional, and towards a defective understanding: at the end of
their studies, the mathematics group endorsed more MP
inferences and fewer DA, AC and MT inferences. Finally, we
demonstrated that this effect was not the result of a domain-
general change in cognitive capacity or thinking disposition, but
rather seems most likely to be associated with the domain-specific
study of mathematics.
Inglis and Simpson [18] found that, compared to intelligence-
matched comparison undergraduates, incoming mathematics
undergraduates reasoned differently on the conditional inference
task used here, but that they did not change over a year of
mathematical study. The authors suggested that the initial
difference may have been due to one of three possibilities which
we aimed to distinguish between: post-compulsory but pre-
university study of mathematics developing reasoning skills;
filtering of more material reasoners into the study of mathematics;
or between-group differences unrelated to intelligence, such as in
thinking disposition. Our findings are consistent with the first
possibility, that the post-compulsory pre-university study of
mathematics develops conditional reasoning skills. At the start of
post-compulsory education, the students studying mathematics in
our sample did not differ from non-mathematics students on the
conditional reasoning task, but they did after a year of study. This
change was not due to between-group differences in initial or
Figure 4. Conditional Inference scores of the two groups at
Time 1 and 2, with reference to the four different interpreta-
tions of the conditional. Error bars show 61 SE of the mean.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069399.g004
Table 4. A regression analysis, predicting change in defective
conditional index scores.
R2 Predictors B Std. Error b
.253** Initial RAPM .003 .005 .093
Initial CRT .012 .017 .107
Prior attainment .000 .001 2.019
RAPM change .010 .008 .217
CRT change .012 .021 .084
Group (0 = literature, 1 =
mathematics)
.082 .033 .337*
RAPM change6Group .004 .010 .067
CRT change6Group 2.023 2.032 2.106
*p,.05;
**p,.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0069399.t004
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changed thinking disposition (or cognitive capacity). However, the
change was best characterized as a move away from the
biconditional interpretation of the conditional towards the
defective interpretation, not towards the material interpretation
favored by logicians.
Given that Cheng et al. [13] found no change in conditional
reasoning scores after a semester of studying formal logic, it may
seem surprising that we found that studying mathematics (with no
formal logic component) was associated with a development in
conditional reasoning. We see two ways of accounting for this
apparent discrepancy. First, as discussed earlier, Cheng et al. [13]
used a series of variants of the Wason Selection Task [14] as their
dependent measure. It may be that, as Sperber et al. [15] have
argued, the Selection Task is simply not a measure of conditional
reasoning ability. Perhaps if Cheng et al. had used a task that was
more straightforwardly related to conditional inference they would
have found an effect.
An alternative possibility is that the study of mathematics
influences conditional reasoning behavior in a different way to the
study of formal logic and that this, in some cases at least, is more
educationally effective. This possibility is plausible for two reasons.
First, we found that development in conditional inference was not
related to changes in intelligence or thinking disposition,
suggesting that studying mathematics could provide some specific
experiences of manipulating concepts logically, which may not be
provided by studying logic (we speculate below on what these
experiences could be). Second, we found that the mathematics
students in our sample did not become consistently more material
across inference types, as we would expect if they had simply
developed a more normative understanding of conditional
statements (which presumably would be the aim of an education
in formal logic). In fact, a defective interpretation is unlikely to lead
to normative responses to the Wason Selection Tasks used by
Cheng et al. (one might expect that reasoners adopting such an
interpretation would choose the true antecedent card and no
others, rather than selecting the normatively correct true
antecedent and false consequent cards).
What then could be the nature of the experiences provided by
mathematical study that could develop a defective interpretation
of the conditional? Mathematics as a discipline is concerned with
deducing the consequences of assumptions. Even before a student
begins to study advanced-level mathematical proofs and axiomatic
systems, their day-to-day activity consists of making modus ponens
deductions from assumptions. Consider, for example, the activity
of solving an equation. One starts with an assumption,
f(x) = x2+8x+19= 0 say, and is required to determine what follows.
For example, a student might deduce that (x+4)2+3= 0, and
conclude that f(x) has a minimum at 3, and therefore that f(x) = 0
has no real solutions. It is notable that the logical manipulations
required here are all forward in direction: they require the student
to assume that p is true and deduce some appropriate q. This line
of reasoning is incompatible with a biconditional reading of the
conditional (taking such a interpretation would require one to
believe that f(x) = 0 having no real solutions is equivalent to f(x)
having a minimum at 3). It is not until students are introduced to
proofs by contradiction that they are regularly required to make
modus tollens deductions; and students are known to find the
transition to indirect proving extremely challenging (e.g. [36,37]).
Our findings also have implications for the debate between
those who favor the suppositional account of conditional reasoning
(e.g., [20]) and mental models theorists (e.g. [25]). Recall that the
mental models theory attributes reasoners’ failure to make the MT
deduction to their unwillingness or inability to ‘flesh out’ the
implicit mental model contained alongside their initial pq model.
Thus mental models theorists would predict that reasoners of
higher ability would be more likely to make the MT deduction. In
contrast the suppositional account suggests that reasoners of high
ability are less likely to make the MT deduction, as they are likely
to adopt a supposition P(q|p) model of the conditional rather than
the more limited conjunction P(p&q) model. Evans et al. found
empirical support for the latter position; that those participants
with higher scores on an intelligence test were less likely to draw
the MT deduction. Our data can be seen as a stronger within-
subjects test of the suppositional account. We found that studying
mathematics was associated, within subjects, with a reduced
likelihood to draw the MT deduction, and increased adoptance of
the defective interpretation. It seems extremely hard to reconcile
this finding with the mental models account. To do so would
require that the individual participants lost the ability or
willingness to flesh out their implicit model as a consequence of
studying advanced mathematics.
Finally, it is important to consider the limitation that results
from the quasi-experimental design of our study: we cannot infer
that if all students were compelled to study advanced mathematics
there would be a society-wide change in conditional reasoning
behavior. It remains a possibility that the TFD only applies to
those who have chosen to study advanced mathematics. Perhaps it
requires a certain keenness to learn and to engage with the course
material in order for a student to develop in the fashion that we
have observed. It is therefore possible that where is it compulsory
to study mathematics until 18, as is the case in most non-UK
contexts [38] not all students will develop their conditional
reasoning skills in the fashion we observed here. Indeed, cross-
cultural comparisons of the development of logic skills in students
studying different curricula (and in particular curricula where
studying mathematics is and is not compulsory until the age of 18)
would be a useful direction for future research.
To summarize, our study has provided evidence that the claims
made by Plato [1] and John Locke [2] highlighted at the start of
the paper have some merit: contrary to Thorndike’s [10] early
findings, studying mathematics at advanced levels is associated
with development of logical reasoning skills.
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